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A core claim about agricultural policy making is that it is ‘compartmentalized’ and 
‘exceptional’. In this picture, the policy process is insulated from other policy 
concerns, has a distinctive system of actors and institutional structures, and rooted in 
extensive governmental intervention in the market and the re-distribution of 
resources from taxpayers to food producers.  
Recently there have been suggestions that a ‘post-exceptional’ agricultural politics 
has emerged, which is more market-driven, has reduced state intervention, and 
where policies reflect influences relating to non-food issues such as the environment. 
This contribution discusses the concepts of compartmentalization and 
exceptionalism and then applies ‘indicators of change’ to a case study of the 2013 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). It concludes that the reform 
provides evidence for ‘shallow’ post-exceptionalism where a historically persistent 
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agricultural policy subsystem has opened up to new actors, incorporated some 
programme change but left the ideational framework largely intact. 
 
Keywords: agricultural politics, Common Agricultural Policy, CAP reform 2013, 
compartmentalization, exceptionalism, post-exceptionalism. 
 
Introduction 
A central element in the historically dominant picture of agricultural policy is that 
decision making takes place in a subsystem with a distinctive set of actors and 
institutional structures that is insulated from other policy concerns (a 
‘compartmentalised’ policy process) and that policy instruments and programmes 
reflect a particular form of state intervention that differs from rules that generally 
apply to other major sectors of the economy (‘exceptionalism’). The agricultural 
policy subsystem has been underpinned by ideational congruence, a consensus over 
values that marginalises some non-farm actors, and which produces policy outcomes 
that favour privileged interests. In recent years, attention has turned to the 
possibilities for a ‘de-compartmentalised’ and ‘post-exceptional’ agricultural politics 
(see Daugbjerg and Feindt, Introduction to this issue). In terms of process, this 
would mean that policy concerns relating to issues such as the environment and 
climate change (all ‘messy’ problems that tend to cut across the traditional 
boundaries of policy making) have become increasingly important; in relation to 
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instruments and programmes, that the highly interventionist role of government has 
weakened. 
This contribution uses four indicators of change that relate to institutions, actors, 
ideas and programmes to assess whether the 2013 reforms of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) provide evidence for post-exceptional agricultural politics. 
Broadly the contribution considers the impact of inter-institutional policy making 
and examines the tensions between the persistence of a strong agricultural policy 
heritage (that strongly emphasises food security and production), and a more open, 
contested and networked politics that reflects a broader range of issues. It concludes 
that the reform provides evidence for what may be termed ‘shallow’ post-
exceptionalism – some movement from a historically persistent agricultural policy 
subsystem involving the inclusion of some new actors and some programme change 
but which leaves the ideational framework largely intact. 
 
Exceptionalism and Post-exceptionalism  
Much of the academic literature on agricultural policy has emphasised 
‘compartmentalization’, ‘exceptionalism’, and the dominance of a ‘state-assisted’ 
paradigm (see Coleman et al. 1997; Rieger 2000; Roederer-Rynning 2010; Skogstad 
1998). Writing on the CAP for example, Grant noted that while the circle of actors 
involved in the policy process had widened in the early 1990s, agricultural policy 
remained ‘highly compartmentalised’, with a ‘high political entry barrier into the 
policy community’ (1997: 148). In this picture, the institutional configuration – at 
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national and EU levels - has been made up of distinctive actors that are contained 
within relatively impermeable boundaries. The agricultural policy subsystem – 
centred on food production – is highly insulated from other policy subsystems such 
as the environment, and the influence of actors who are not central to the core of the 
subsystem is limited.  
‘Exceptionalism’ highlights a durable interpretive framework, how policy ideas, 
values and norms are embedded within institutional structures, and shape policy 
programmes. As defined by Skogstad, it is the ‘idea that agriculture is a sector unlike 
any other economic sector, and, as such, warrants special government support’. This 
in turn provides the underpinning for the development of the ‘state assisted 
paradigm’ with its associated government intervention in relation to regulation and 
expenditure (1998: 468). The concept of agricultural exceptionalism therefore 
‘describes the special treatment of the agricultural sector by governments and 
international organizations, and the belief system that provides cognitive 
justification and political legitimation’ (Daugbjerg and Feindt, Introduction to this 
issue: 1). 
Bringing compartmentalization and exceptionalism together, Daugbjerg and Feindt 
note that the agricultural policy subsystem has been characterized ‘by a distinct set 
of sector-oriented institutions and ideas’, ‘substantial government intervention in the 
market’, and the redistribution of resources to a ‘relatively small group of producers 
and land owners’ (Introduction to this issue: 1). A key part of this picture is the 
emphasis on policy networks, an approach well-suited to established policy 
subsystems such as agriculture where the status quo is reinforced by ideational 
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consensus around the nature of food production (for a summary see Greer 2005: 23-
30; Marsh and Smith 2000). Agriculture policies and associated institutions have 
been protected by established decision-rules and dominant policy communities. The 
idea of closed policy communities has been especially prevalent, drawing attention 
to stable interactions and bargaining over time between state ‘agriculture’ 
departments and well-resourced groups representing farmers, based on consensus 
around values, with largely incremental policy outcomes (Smith 1992).  
What then would ‘post-exceptional’ agricultural policy look like? In the first instance 
it would involve the weakening of the historically dominant closed policy 
communities centred on farmers and the emergence of more ‘open’ network 
governance involving a wider range of actors, struggles between competing 
interests, and corresponding shifts in the nature of policy interventions. There is 
some evidence for this over the last twenty five years, indicating that policy crisis 
and exogenous pressures (relating for example to trade liberalisation) can be crucial 
factors. In the context of BSE and other food crises in the UK for instance, some 
analysts identified the emergence of an issue network type structure with a wider 
range of pressure participants in addition to the historically dominant farmers’ 
organizations (see Grant 2004; Jordan et al. 1994; Smith 1991). Certainly there has 
been a broadening of the policy agenda, with the inclusion within the agriculture 
subsystem of issues such as environmental sustainability, rural development and 
climate change, alongside the traditional focus on food security and production. 
However such issues can be absorbed into an agricultural paradigm, as is shown in 
the creation of the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) 
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in the UK (Winter 2003: 51) and there is disagreement over whether the 
configuration of institutions and actors has been substantially reshaped. So while 
Woods (2005) referred to the ‘collapse’ of the agricultural policy community, for 
others the policy process on the 2001 outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in 
the UK provided ‘little evidence for the emergence of an issue network’ and the 
outcomes ‘exhibited a degree of continuity far more consistent with a policy 
community’ centred on the historically powerful farmers’ organizations (Wilkinson 
et al. 2010: 337-8).  
A second element relates to a weakening of the ‘state assistance paradigm’ and the 
historically high degree of government intervention in the policy subsystem. In 
Skogstad’s argument paradigm change ‘is indicated by deregulation of agricultural 
markets, the termination or substantial restraint of government expenditures for 
agriculture, and a discourse antithetical to government intervention’ (1998: 471). 
Here there also is disagreement. For some, cumulative change to the CAP – 
including under the MacSharry reforms (1992) and the Fischler package (2003) – 
represents a decisive ideational shift in policy values and in instruments that has 
substantially weakened the producer interest, illustrated for example by the move 
away from direct support for production to decoupled area payments. Burrell (2009) 
charts a pattern of continuous reform from a highly centralized protectionist policy 
focused on farm incomes to one that is more market sensitive and environmentally 
sustainable. For others continuity is emphasized within the framework of the state-
assisted paradigm (although it may include the incorporation of new objectives), 
exemplified in stable budgets and patterns of redistribution, persisting institutional 
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settings and path dependence. As Daugbjerg and Feindt note ‘we almost face a 
paradox with much change in policy instruments, ideas and discourses while farm 
income remains the unaffected “policy core” with relatively stable redistribution of 
resources into the farm sector’ (Introduction to this issue: 4).  
Yet policy change should not be viewed as a one-way process. The notion of 
‘sequencing’ shows how changes to the CAP are not necessarily in the same 
direction and that each reform event opens possibilities for further ‘reform’ 
(Daugbjerg 2009). A reversal to older institutional logics is also possible. While 
Erjavec et al. (2008) argue that the policy discourse of (Agriculture Commissioners) 
Fischler and Fischer-Boel reflected a neo-liberal rhetoric, others claim that the tenure 
of Cioloş saw a shift back to the state-assisted position in which subsidies are 
defended as a way to ensure a fair and efficient European agriculture (Rutz et al. 
2014).      
In this context, ‘post-exceptionalism’ can be used as a diagnostic concept that 
highlights both continuity and change in the agricultural policy subsystem. For 
Daugbjerg and Feindt, the value of the concept is that it captures ‘the combination of 
a less compartmentalized policy arena’ with ideas that ‘retain claims that a policy 
sector is special, albeit with updated arguments that relate to the problems on the 
evolving policy agenda (e.g., sustainability, climate change) and which trigger novel 
policy instruments’ (Introduction to this issue: 8). As they summarize, there is ‘a set 
of exceptionalist ideas which legitimize a set of compartmental institutions that 
provide a dedicated policy space for a policy community to adopt and implement 
policy instruments and programmes that serve their interests and comply with their 
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ideas’ (original italics, Introduction to this issue: 4). Drawing on these insights, there 
are four dimensions that can be used as to develop indicators for the emergence of a 
post-exceptional agricultural politics:   
1. Changes to the institutional structure of the policy subsystem;  
2. The incorporation of ‘new’ actors and interests; 
3. A weakening of the dominant ideational structure, with the introduction of 
conflicting values, new policy areas and ideas; and  
4. A weakening of policy stability, with policy change reflected in instruments 
and programmes. 
In what follows, these four ‘indicators of change’ are applied to an analysis of the 
2013 reform of the CAP. 
 
CAP Reform 2013  
There is considerable disagreement about whether agricultural policy reform can be 
viewed as radical and extensive, or minimal and incremental. Proponents of the 
latter emphasise the obstacles in the way of CAP reform, sometimes using ideas 
about historical institutionalism and path-dependence (Kay 2003). Incremental 
policy change leaves the ‘state-assisted’ paradigm largely intact. This is the result of 
bargaining between actors in which the key factors are the preferences and 
institutional structures of member states (brought together in the Agriculture 
Council), with the Commission playing a crucial role in setting the agenda, both 
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buttressed by closed producer-dominated agricultural policy communities. 
Nonetheless change does happen, often as a result of wider policy ideas and 
exogenous factors such as trade liberalisation and budget reform, which may be 
important in weakening the compartment from the outside (Daugbjerg and 
Swinbank 2009; Lynggaard and Nedergaard 2009). Moreover, incremental policy 
change can have substantial cumulative effects over time (see Ackrill 2000; Cunha 
2011; Keeler 1996; Swinbank 1999; Swinnen 2009).  
Following initial consultations in spring 2010 about the CAP after 2014, the EU 
Commission’s Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG 
Agri) published legislative proposals in October 2011 (European Commission 2010, 
2011 b & c; Swinbank 2012). After protracted negotiations, a political deal was 
reached on 26 June 2013, with everything finalised in the autumn. As one 
contemporary report put it, agreement came ‘after months of haggling over how 
ambitious the policy would be on overhauling direct payments, ending quotas, and 
making farmers more environmentally accountable’ (Spence 2013).  
Wider negotiations about the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2014-2020 
were an important influence on the CAP reform debate. Here there were pressures 
for a radical reorientation of priorities and for lower spending in the context of 
austerity, which would inevitably mean a reduction in the agriculture budget (Greer 
2013, 2012). Matthews (2015) identifies three linkages between the MFF and CAP 
negotiations: (1) the reform was shaped ‘by the need to create a narrative to 
legitimise and defend the share of the CAP budget’ in the MFF (2015: 169); (2) there 
was a condensed negotiation window because the key actors delayed finalising their 
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positions on CAP reform until the budget proposals were agreed in early 2013; and 
(3) some aspects of CAP reform – relating to convergence and greening for example 
– were included in the MFF itself (with a subsequent impact on the decision making 
process).  
In essence, the broad lines of the reform were set out in the MFF, leaving the 
Agriculture Council to fill in the specific details. While there were disagreements 
between austerity-minded countries (Germany and the UK wanted a squeeze on the 
total budget) and those who wanted to keep agricultural spending at the existing 
level (e.g. France, Italy and Spain), the outcome of the MFF was that as a percentage 
of the budget, spending on the CAP will decrease slowly to around a third of the 
total by 2020 (the absolute figures remain relatively stable). As the Commission 
noted, this showed ‘continued strong support for an ambitious agricultural policy’ 
(2013: 3), and it also ‘surprised and delighted farm groups’ (Matthews 2015: 171). 
Crucially the MFF maintained the 75:25 spending ratio between pillar 1 and pillar 2, 
which was a setback for countries such as the UK which wanted a reorientation of 
funds from direct payments to rural development programmes - indeed the 
negotiations resulted in a reduction on the original plans of around two per cent for 
pillar 1 but by nearly eight per cent for pillar 2.  
Key objectives for the Commission were to combine a ‘greener and more equitably 
distributed’ first pillar alongside a second pillar ‘more focussed on competitiveness 
and innovation, climate change and the environment’ (2011a: 16). As well as making 
the CAP more efficient and effective, a core aim was for a fairer distribution of 
payments - across pillars, between farmers (from larger to smaller enterprises) and 
11 | P a g e  
 
between ‘old’ and ‘new’ member states. To do this, the approach had three main 
elements – convergence, capping, and greening – and combined compulsory 
requirements with voluntary options. The extent to which this approach can meet 
the objectives set is still unclear (especially in relation to redistribution) but what is 
clear is that the reform has substantially extended the ability of member states to 
tailor the CAP to their own conditions (e.g. for regionalising the basic payment, 
continuing ‘coupled’ support, providing assistance for small farmers, ‘capping’ and 
the reduction of payments, and environmental sustainability). 
In the distribution of resources, member states can strike different balances between 
pillar 1 and pillar 2. For most countries, up to 15 per cent of national envelopes can 
be transferred in either direction and are not restricted to increasing funding for 
rural development (some are allowed to transfer up to 25 per cent). Eleven member 
states have decided to transfer funds to pillar 2, mostly at a rate of less than 5 per 
cent each year (only the UK and Estonia will apply relatively high rates of transfer at 
10.8 and 15 per cent respectively). Five member states (mainly in eastern Europe) 
opted to transfer funds to pillar 1, with Poland transferring the maximum 25 per 
cent. Overall the net funding gain for pillar 2 will be €3bn over six years (European 
Commission 2016: 4), a very small amount in relation to the total funding.   
Within the suite of direct aid schemes, the Basic Payment Scheme (BPS), young 
farmers’ scheme, and the greening payment are compulsory; countries (and regions 
within them) also have flexibility to implement a ‘redistributive payment’, introduce 
voluntary coupled support schemes (VCS), and support measures in areas with 
natural constraints (ANC). Only Denmark has chosen to implement the ANC 
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payment, whereas all countries except Germany have opted to use VCS, covering a 
whole range of production sectors but especially beef and dairy (11 member states 
have allocated the maximum 13 per cent, 9 have allocated less than 8 per cent). 
Fifteen ‘countries’ have decided to adopt the new simplified ‘small farmers’ scheme 
(that replaces all of the other direct payments schemes for the beneficiaries 
concerned). The overall impact of this enhanced flexibility (or ‘renationalisation’) is 
that both the structure of the CAP in member states and the share of funding 
allocated to different schemes can ‘vary significantly throughout the EU’ (European 
Commission 2013: 7; 2016: 20).  
A central reform aim for the Commission was ‘convergence’ to narrow variations in 
direct payments across countries, particularly between old and ‘new’ Europe 
(‘external’ convergence), and between producers with ‘fairer treatment of farmers 
performing the same activities’ (‘internal’ convergence)(European Commission 
2011a: 16). French and Spanish ministers had strong reservations about this because 
they feared that redistribution would reduce the benefits received by their own 
farmers (a Commission estimate put this as high as a seven per cent reduction for 
French farmers). Consequently they wanted a more careful phasing in of 
convergence and complained that the ‘magnitude’ and ‘pace’ proposed by the 
Commission was ‘not acceptable’ (Euractiv.com 2012b).  
The restructuring of the architecture for direct payments is the principal mechanism 
for achieving convergence. For external convergence, national envelopes are 
adjusted to bring them closer to the EU average; increased for those where the 
average payment is below 90 per cent of the EU average, correspondingly adjusted 
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downwards for those member states receiving more than the average. A minimum 
average national or regional payment (at least 75 per cent of the EU average) will be 
achieved by 2019. For ‘internal convergence’ the intention is that payments under 
the BPS within member states become more uniform. For example countries may 
decide to introduce a flat rate at either national or regional level from 2015, or to 
achieve this by 2019, or to increase the payments to those farms receiving less than 
90 per cent of the average (with each payment entitlement normally reaching a 
minimum of 60 per cent of the average by 2019). No farmer receiving payments 
above the average will lose more than 30 per cent of their entitlements (European 
Commission 2015a). Among the eighteen member states implementing the BPS (ten 
2004 entrants continue to apply the flat rate Single Area Payment until 2020), six 
opted for regionalising the payments (including Germany and the UK), four 
countries/regions (including Germany and England) introduced the flat rate from 
2015, five (including both Scotland and Wales) will apply the flat rate from 2019, and 
the others will apply a partial convergence by 2019 (European Commission 2015a: 7). 
A hotly disputed element of the reform was the proposal for ‘capping’ – the 
introduction of a maximum ceiling on payments - which had been fiercely resisted in 
previous reform episodes by countries with efficient and large scale enterprises such 
as the UK and France. The Commission proposed that payment levels should 
‘progressively converge’ and payments to large beneficiaries subject to ‘progressive 
capping’ to improve the distribution of payments between farmers (2011b: 3). 
Reductions (degressivity) would start at 20 per cent for entitlements between 
€150,000 and €200,000, gradually increasing in three stages to a 100 per cent 
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reduction at a maximum ceiling for payments of €300,000. The final compromise 
reform allowed substantial flexibility to member states across a range of decisions. 
While all are required to reduce payments above €150,000 at a minimum rate of 5 per 
cent, member states have the choice about whether to cap payments. Fifteen 
‘countries’ (only England in the UK) will apply the minimum reduction, whereas 
nine will apply a cap at different rates on amounts ranging from €150,000 (including 
Ireland and Poland) to €600,000 in Scotland. Italy introduced a 50 per cent reduction 
at €150,000 and 100 per cent at €500,000; Wales opted for the most graduated system, 
starting at 15 per cent over €150,000, increasing in stages to a 100 per cent reduction 
at €300,000. It is estimated by the Commission that these decisions will transfer over 
€500m to rural development between 2015 and 2019 (European Commission 2016: 8 
& 21). 
Within direct payments, countries can adopt a voluntary ‘redistributive payment’ to 
favour smaller holdings by diverting up to 30 per cent of the national envelope to 
farmers on the first thirty hectares of land (European Commission 2016: 10). 
Countries that introduce a redistributive element at a rate of at least five per cent are 
not required also to reduce payments. Nine countries/regions (but only Wales in the 
UK, and Wallonia in Belgium) introduced the redistributive measure, of which six 
(including France) coupled this with no reduction of payment. Poland, Bulgaria and 
Wales decided to introduce the redistributive payment alongside the reduction of 
payments mechanism (European Commission 2016: 8).  
The greatest controversy surrounded the proposals for ‘greening’, in which 30 per 
cent of direct payments within pillar 1 are conditional on ‘environmentally 
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supportive practices’ with farmers receiving payments to deliver public goods 
(European Commission 2011a: 16). These practices were to include crop 
diversification (the ‘three crop rule’), maintenance of permanent grassland, and the 
preservation of ecological reserves and landscapes. However the original proposals 
were considerably altered in the negotiations (see below). Here also member states 
have considerable flexibility in relation to policy choices, for example about the ratio 
of permanent grassland, whether to adopt the ‘equivalence mechanism’, the number 
and types of designated ecological focus areas (EFA), and the rules for making the 
payment (European Commission 2016: 14-18).  
In other areas, the desire to foster market competitiveness was reflected in the 
removal of remaining production limits and the introduction of measures to 
facilitate co-operation between producers. Although market intervention remains as 
a safety net, and the last remaining export subsidies are reduced to zero, the force of 
renewed arguments about food security underpinned decisions to retain some 
production quotas – for sugar until 2017 (two years later than their planned 
abolition) and a new vine planting scheme after 2016 was introduced.  
 
A ‘post-exceptional’ CAP? 
Four indicators for assessing the extent of movement to a post-exceptional 
agricultural policy were identified above, so how does the 2013 CAP reform fare in 
relation to these?  
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New Institutions and Structures  
Compartmentalization has been a central feature of agricultural exceptionalism, but 
constitutional change provides one avenue for ’institutional broadening’ (for 
example the integration of agriculture into other regimes such as environmental 
protection). An important factor in the CAP reform process was the new institutional 
structure brought in by the Lisbon Treaty, in which ‘co-decision’ was extended to the 
CAP (see Greer 2013; Greer and Hind 2012). The European Parliament (EP) is now a 
formal co-actor in the agricultural policy process, sharing legislative power with the 
Council of Ministers. The 2013 CAP reform was the first major agricultural policy 
dossier to be subject to co-decision. Between April and June 2013 more than forty 
‘trialogue’ discussions took place – informal tripartite bargaining between the three 
main institutions before the opening of formal conciliation negotiations. An inter-
institutional deal was reached in June 2013 and the Agriculture Council then 
adopted the reform package without discussion following a first reading agreement 
with the EP.  
For Swinnen and Knops, the entry of the EP as a ‘new player’ in decision-making 
resulted in ‘a reshuffle of the rules of the game, with new coalition opportunities and 
inter-institutional transfers of power’ (2014: 73). However, the parallel negotiations 
on the MFF restricted the EP’s room for manoeuvre and ‘set the overall framework’ 
within which it negotiated with the Council (Swinnen and Knops 2014: 17). Co-
decision certainly prolonged the policy process - with agreement reached around 
two years after the Commission published its legislative proposals - and the 
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implementation of most of the reforms was delayed until 2015, rather than 2014 as 
planned.  
In advance of the reform, Greer and Hind (2012) sketched out some scenarios for 
how inter-institutional relationships might be reconfigured under co-decision. These 
included the possibility that the EP would gain influence at the expense of both 
Commission and Council (the ‘conventional’ scenario), and that a dominant Council-
EP axis would develop. Some observers conclude that inter-institutional bargaining 
weakened the influence of the Commission and enhanced that of the Council 
Presidency (Matthews 2013), but there is no clear consensus among actors and 
commentators about which scenario best summarises the ‘reality’. As reported in a 
study by the Centre for European Policy Studies, (using an interview sample of 34 
actors composed mainly of those working in the EP, but also including some 
working in the Commission, the Council and from civil society), 40 per cent 
favoured the conventional scenario, 30 per cent believed that the other institutions 
gained power, and a quarter said that none of the scenarios described the process 
particularly well (Swinnen and Knops 2014: 74).  
Overall the evidence indicates that the policy process on CAP reform has been 
substantially altered in terms of its institutional structures at the EU level, and that 
new patterns of inter-institutional policy-making have emerged. The question 
however is whether this has been accompanied by the entry of new actors and ideas 
in the policy subsystem. 
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New Actors & Interests 
Agricultural exceptionalism buttresses the interests of food producers, structured in 
dominant policy communities. Post-exceptionalism would see the emergence of 
actor constellations of a more ‘issue-network’ type that include ‘players from a wider 
range of backgrounds’ such as consumer, environmental and animal welfare groups, 
and slow food activists. However conflict is not inevitable and coalition building – 
e.g. between farmers and environmentalists – may form around exceptionalist ideas. 
Paradoxically, while this can help to stabilize the ideational framework, it may also 
indicate a movement towards post-exceptionalism (Daugbjerg and Feindt, 
Introduction to this issue: 9). 
 
Despite the institutional changes around the CAP it is not clear that the policy 
subsystem has substantially opened up to a wider range of actors and interests. 
Certainly the EP has a greater formal role in CAP decision-making, but the extent to 
which this indicates a post-exceptional agricultural politics is debatable. Importantly 
the work of the EP is itself ‘compartmentalised’, with a crucial role for functional 
committees such as the Agriculture and Rural Development standing committee 
(COMAGRI). Although its membership reflects the political balance of the 
Parliament as a whole, it is dominated by farming, landowning and rural interests 
(Greer and Hind 2012). So co-decision may actually have strengthened farmer bias 
insofar as the political centre of gravity of COMAGRI lies, around ‘centre to-right 
farmer-friendly parties’, its geographic orientation ‘around a group of countries 
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traditionally favouring an interventionist interpretation of the CAP’ (Roederer-
Rynning 2015: 354).  
 
While the Commission conducted what it presented as an ‘inclusive’ public 
consultation and debate at the beginning of the reform process in 2010, it is not clear 
that ‘new’ actors and interests had much influence on the outcome. Overall the 
influence of civil society actors was limited; environmental actors for example 
believe that their influence was at best marginal and that farm interests dominated 
the debate. However, this view is not universally shared. Co-decision did intensify 
contacts between the EP and stakeholders generally, so it may have opened up the 
relatively closed subsystem to some degree, albeit in an indirect way. Indeed the 
‘broadening of interests’, which some observers such as Greer and Hind (2012) had 
speculated about in relation to COMAGRI, ‘might have actually happened via the 
emergence of a European civil society’ (Swinnen and Knops 2014:  72).  
 
New values and ideas 
The importance of a changed constellation of actors depends partly on the 
assumption that this will bring with it new values and policy ideas. As Richardson 
has noted, new ideas pose a particular threat to established policy communities 
because they can ‘disrupt existing policy systems, power relationships and policies' 
(2000: 1017-8). In agricultural policy, this usually has been taken to mean a challenge 
to the preferences of the established productivist policy community, and to core 
ideas such as the notion that supporting the farm sector is vital to the broader 
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national interest, especially in relation to food security and the role of stable farm 
incomes in underpinning rural communities (Skogstad 1998: 468).  
In ideational terms, post-exceptionalism might be indicated by greater influence for 
market liberal ideas, but these may be absorbed and re-interpreted in a way that 
preserves the notion that the sector is special. While in previous CAP reforms, policy 
windows were forced open by developments in relation to trade liberalisation and 
enlargement, the 2013 version was relatively insulated from wider exogenous 
pressures. For example Daugbjerg notes that the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is 
only referred to briefly in the Commission’s original CAP reform communication, 
that domestic concerns were prioritised, and that pressure from the WTO ‘vanished’ 
when the Doha Round stalled in late 2008 (2016: 12). On the other hand, 
exceptionalism may be strengthened by connecting agriculture to ‘new overarching 
discourses such as sustainability and globalization, and cross-cutting concerns such 
as the environment, climate change and food security’ (Daugbjerg and Feindt, 
Introduction to this issue: 9). In the 2013 CAP reform there is some evidence of 
collaboration between groups representing farmers and environmentalists in 
resisting the extension of market liberalism and in protecting budgets. Overall 
however, analysis suggests that the EP’s formal role in decision making buttressed 
the established policy subsystem and that the changed institutional structure around 
the CAP did not facilitate the introduction of new values and ideas. Swinnen and 
Knops remark for example that most policy ideas within the EP were ‘little more 
than a return to the market regulation instruments of the past’, influenced by 
agricultural exceptionalism and ‘justified by arguments relating to food security and 
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economic crisis’ (2014: 14 & 95). As Matthews (2013) further notes, the notion that the 
EP ‘would bring new ideas to the debate and help to widen the range of interests 
that could influence agricultural policy also proved to be hopelessly naïve’. 
 
Policy change 
The fourth indicator for the emergence of post exceptional agricultural policy 
making relates to policy instruments and programmes. Exceptionalism was 
characterised by some specific policy mechanisms such as payments for production, 
tariffs and quotas, and intervention buying to stabilize prices. Certainly there has 
been a move away from these instruments over the last thirty years, indicated by the 
removal of many ‘trade distorting’ market support mechanisms, the introduction of 
‘decoupled’ direct payments, and pillar 2 measures such as agri-environment 
schemes, often justified using rhetoric about the provision of public goods. In the 
2013 CAP reform, the Commission placed particular emphasis on promoting market 
competitiveness, convergence and capping to promote fairer distribution of 
resources, and the ‘greening’ of a substantial element of direct payments. While this 
may be viewed as consistent with a post-exceptional direction of travel, the retention 
of some market intervention instruments and the introduction of voluntary coupled 
support schemes (that have been adopted by over twenty countries), seem to suggest 
the persistence of older logics around food security. In convergence and capping 
some countries also have exploited the flexibility allowed to reinforce more 
traditional exceptionalism. The ideas for ‘greening’ in particular were the subject of 
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much debate and controversy. While environmentalists were sceptical about the 
impact of the ‘limited greening’ proposed by the Commission, for farmers the 
proposals undermined the EU’s capacity to meet food security objectives, and some 
governments including France and Spain argued for a ‘flexible’ system in which it 
would be possible to have ‘agriculturally sustainable use of areas of ecological 
interest’ (Euractiv.com 2012a).  
The agreed reform markedly watered down the Commission’s proposals on 
greening; indeed some even suggest that the outcome was ‘a step backwards for the 
integration of environmental concerns into the CAP’ (Hart 2015: 246). According to a 
spokesperson for the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), while the proposals 
sowed ‘some green shoots of hope’, these were ‘quickly cut down’ in the inter-
institutional bargaining. By ‘trying to exempt as many farmers as possible from the 
most basic agronomic practices, they diluted the content of the greening measures 
and added dozens of grounds for exemption to already very weak rules’ (Defossez 
2014). There are no EU-wide performance standards, member states have flexibility 
in implementation, and a range of exceptions relating to water pollution, ecological 
focus areas, crop diversification and environmental sustainability were introduced. 
So although a core principle of the original proposals was that greening should 
apply to all farms, nearly half of all farmland and 89 per cent of farmers will not be 
covered by the rules (for a full discussion of the greening outcomes see Hart 2015: 
263-9).  
This ‘greenwashing’ was largely a result of the inter-institutional bargaining 
between the EP and Council, although the interplay between them was complex. 
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Both were concerned about the impact of greening on competitiveness, production 
and food security, and supported plans to introduce ‘greater flexibility’, reflecting 
concerns expressed by farming stakeholder groups about ‘being locked into 
standardised environmental rules despite the diverse landscape of European 
agriculture’ (Spence 2013). Within COMAGRI, environmental considerations ‘were 
drowned out by concerns about agricultural production effects’ and there were few 
environmental interests in the EU institutions ‘that saw much to be gained from a 
protracted defence of proposals whose environmental delivery looked likely to be 
disappointing’ (Hart 2015: 271-2). As a spokesperson for BirdLife Europe 
complained, ‘Europe is offered a budget that scales back investment in the 
environment and caters for the usual fat cats that have been milking the system’ 
(Harrabin 2013). So while environmental groups helped to fend off some proposals – 
such as paying farmers twice for carrying out the same activity in pillar 1 and pillar 2 
- their influence overall was weak.  
 
 Post-Exceptional Agricultural Policy? 
In this analysis, four indicators for assessing whether agricultural policy can be 
described as post-exceptional have been applied to the 2013 CAP reform. The 
evidence is mixed. It is plausible to argue that (1) new institutional structures apply 
to agricultural policy, (2) that as a result of the Lisbon Treaty some new actors and 
interests are involved in the decision process, and (3) that there has been some 
further (if weak) extension of programmes and instruments in a direction consistent 
24 | P a g e  
 
with post exceptionalism. On the other hand, this has not been accompanied by 
substantial change in the ideational and value framework.   
For Commissioner Cioloş, the reform was a ‘paradigm shift’ with its focus on 
greening, a fairer system of redistribution, and the reinforcement of the concept of 
public money for public goods (quoted in House of Commons 2013: 6). Certainly it is 
possible to identify an aim for some radical change, even if the Commission saw its 
proposals as striking a mid-position between gradual adjustment and far-reaching 
reform. However while some important policy changes were introduced, these 
arguably fit better with incremental shift in the established policy direction rather 
than radical re-design. For critics such as the UK Environment Secretary, Owen 
Patterson, the agreement did not even advance the reform trajectory started by 
MacSharry and continued by Fischler, or reinforce the emphasis on public goods; 
indeed there were some areas ‘where we definitely go backwards’, for example with 
the reintroduction of coupled payments (House of Commons 2013: 6). Greening also 
was markedly watered down and how extensive will be any redistribution of 
resources as a result of capping and convergence remains unclear.  
Essentially the changed institutional and actor context did not go hand-in-hand with 
ideational and more extensive policy change because the decision rules and 
institutional structures around the CAP, plus the balance of forces between member 
states – most of whom like the CAP - still works as a barrier against radical change 
(see Greer 2013 for a discussion of the preferences of member states). Co-decision, 
and the MFF agreement (as well as the weak influence of exogenous factors such as 
trade liberalisation), reinforced the existing policy subsystem rather than open it up 
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to new influences and ideas. So despite the changed context, policy ideas and 
programmes were not affected in a way that substantially weakened the preferences 
of the established policy subsystem. As Matthews argues, once the threat of a budget 
cut in the MFF had receded, the institutional structure favoured those such as farm 
groups who took ‘a status quo position on the reform proposals’ while 
disadvantaging those ‘who sought a more radical change’ (2015: 178). For Erjavec et 
al. the rhetoric around the reforms hid the desire of a conservative block ‘to extend 
the re-distributional logic of the CAP within a still comprehensive budget while 
implementing as few paradigmatic changes as possible’ (2015: 236). 
It seems clear then, in terms of the ideational underpinnings of those actors who 
were influential in the reform process, that the dominant motivation was the desire 
to support farm production and farm incomes. As Erjavec et al. suggest, although the 
Commission’s core aims emphasised the environment and climate change (for 
example at least 30 per cent of spending in pillar 2 rural development programmes 
must be reserved for such measures), they were reinterpreted in ways that preserve 
the CAP (2015: 232). So while an alternative discourse about environmental 
sustainability and climate change was present, this was heavily outweighed by 
productivist objectives and a traditional discourse that emphasised food production 
and food security. 
Issues about rural development, environmental sustainability and climate change 
have all been integrated to some degree within the CAP in recent years, and there is 
some evidence to support post-exceptionalism in terms of changed institutional 
structures and actors. Overall however the policy impact has been weak and the 
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ideational framework little altered. The analysis of the 2013 CAP reforms in this 
contribution views them as consistent with a sequencing in which an older policy 
heritage around food production and security is reasserted, rather than a substantial 
shift to reflecting non-productivist concerns. Indeed farm incomes arguably continue 
to be the main driving force underpinning the CAP, as illustrated by trade dispute 
between the EU and Russia a result of the conflict in Ukraine (the EU response to a 
Russian embargo on agricultural products was to provide a €500m relief package for 
farmers hit by falls in prices as a result of the loss of export markets)(European 
Commission 2015b).   
 
It is important to note, however, that with greater flexibility for countries, different 
national patterns may emerge, with some moving at a faster rate than others 
towards post-exceptionalism in agriculture. After the 2013 reforms, what exists in 
relation to the CAP is still an ‘agricultural’ policy subsystem, albeit one that exhibits 
both continuity and change. The CAP reform illustrates what might be described as 
‘shallow’ post-exceptionalism, insofar as there has been some shift from a 
historically persistent agricultural policy subsystem with the inclusion of new 
institutions and actors/interests, some limited change in policy programmes and 
instruments, but leaving the ideational framework around redistribution and farms 
subsidies largely intact. 
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